INTRODUCING DEVELOPMENTALITY

International development is inextricably linked to the practice and institutions of development aid. Despite the inherent asymmetries, it is founded on a relationship between donor and recipient institutions, today expressed as one of partnership based on mutuality, trust, recipient ownership and participation. In practice, however, few would deny the inherently lopsided nature of aid relations. This book deals with how and why these asymmetries persist despite the many bold and sincere attempts to revamp and dismantle them, some even put forward by those considered to be the privileged part of the donor–recipient relationship. Why does this proactive and radical rhetoric lag so much behind the reality it purports to address, and what are the mechanisms that reproduce the paternalism of development? How do development donors reassert their control even after they have formally granted their recipients greater freedom and responsibility in managing processes formerly controlled chiefly by the donors? Drawing upon multisited ethnographic fieldwork within the World Bank in Washington DC and a Ugandan ministry, this book offers an ethnography of their partnership relation, arguing that this lopsided aid relation is continuously reproduced but through a more indirect, subtle and tacit kind of power than the previous direct coercion. Moreover, the conditions for such tacit governance are produced by precisely the same policies and practices that the Bank has put in place in seeking to dismantle its own trusteeship while granting recipients greater freedom to manage their own development process. I call this power 'developmentality' (Lie 2015).

I coined and first employed the 'developmentality' concept in 2004 (see Lie 2004; also available as Lie 2009). At that time, the only scholarly use of the term was in relation to child psychology (see e.g. Fendler 2001) and no references to the field of development existed. Applications of the governmentality perspective to the neoliberal turn of development have since then proliferated, including some instances of 'developmentality' (see Ilcan and Phillips 2006, 2010; Legg 2006; Mawuko-Yevugah 2010). Of these, Ilcan and Phillips (2010) provide the most interesting

and thorough conceptualization of developmentality, although in its plural form. There are many common denominators with regard to applying a governmentality approach to the organization of development aid, but Ilcan and Phillips' 'developmentalities' pertains exclusively to the UN Millennium Development Goals, whereas I employ the developmentality concept to the new aid architecture and the partnership formation within the aid sector in general, and World Bank–Uganda relations in particular. Hence, whereas they focus on programmes, I focus on distinct institutions with a general argument on the formation of partnership, and while much of the governmentality-inspired literature takes an excessively top-down view of development, this book – and indeed the developmentality concept – is empirically driven and founded on practices.

Developmentality emerges from the new formation of development partnership formed in the nexus of the new rhetoric of participation and established practices of conditionality (Lie 2006b, 2010). The conventional aid relationship has changed. A fundamental shift came with donor withdrawal from direct operational activities and running their own projects to a more distanced role focused more on funding the activities of their local partner institutions and organizations now granted the overall responsibility for policy making and implementation. This transition – also referred to as a move from first-generation to second-generation reform (Harrison 2004) – represents the centrepiece of what has become known as the new aid architecture. It is characterized by a new form of partnership based on the morally charged ideas of ownership and participation (Nelson and Wright 1995; Cleaver 2001). This transition, driven largely by ambitions of making aid more effective, has been based on the idea that more ownership and greater participation of aid recipients in processes previously controlled by donors would translate into improved sensitization and enhanced recipient commitment – which, in turn, would yield better results and more development per dollar invested.[1] This new partnership formation has served other objectives as well. By being more inclusive and bottom–up oriented, it could respond to the criticisms levelled against donor–recipient relations for their trusteeship, donor imposition of one-size-fits-all policies and top–down conditionality approaches. With the new partnership formation, development assistance now promised to be more contextual, sensitized and inclusive – based more on the needs of the recipient than those of the donor.

There is, however, a sizable discrepancy between the formal order and rhetoric of development and its practice. This disjuncture should not be understood solely as resulting from bad planning, flawed pol-

icies, weak implementation or lack of commitment by the involved actors. Instead, it should be recognized as logically connected: when donors lose control in one way, they seek to reassert it in others. Another way of seeing this disjuncture is by inverting the conventional relationship between policy and practice (see Mosse 2004a). Aid practitioners' obsession with policy making rests on the assumption of altering and directing future practices by establishing causality between development design and input and expected output. But what if, as Mosse asks, 'instead of policy producing practice, practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of events?' (ibid.: 640); and what if 'development practice is not driven by policy? … What if the practices of development are in fact concealed rather than produced by policy' (Mosse 2005b: 2; Mosse 2006). Seen this way, the new policies and rhetoric of partnership, participation and ownership are the result of – and, indeed, serve to legitimize – existing dynamics, lopsided relations and practices. This is not because of bad intentions or some well-orchestrated conspiracy: it simply shows the potential formative power that established development discourses and structures might have.

This book redirects the analytical attention from the formative power of development discourses to a focus on actors and practices. That makes it possible to see how development practice is driven not by policy but by a multi-layered complex of relationships and epistemic knowledge battles within and between donor and recipient institutions regarding the partnership formation, with development practitioners striving to maintain coherent representations of their actions as instances of the established policy.

It should thus come as no surprise that aid donors still try to direct, guide and govern their recipients even after formally handing over responsibility for the development process to their partners and counterparts (Borchgrevink 2008). These governance mechanisms have, however, taken on a new form. Instead of being direct and coercive, they are now more subtle, tacit and indirect – and they are based on the donor's framing, restricting the freedom granted to the recipient institutions by the 'liberal' new aid architecture and its notion of partnership. In practice – as this book shows – development cooperation is characterized by two conflicting logics: on the one hand the liberal agenda of empowering aid recipients to make their own decisions; on the other hand, the donors' need to exert control and promote their own policies. Through processes of responsibilization, aid recipients are expected to govern and develop themselves – all the while remaining accountable to the donor for implementing what are formally their own

policies but in reality bear a heavy donor imprint. This reproduction of asymmetrical donor–recipient relationships should not be seen as a failure to implement the new aid architecture and the partnership ideals: it is more of an active process through which the donor institution works to get its own policies acknowledged as those of the recipient. This nexus of control and freedom, conditionality and participation, amounting to a governance strategy, is succinctly phrased by a donor informant: 'ownership exists when they do what we want them to do but they do so voluntarily' (Randel, German and Ewing 2002: 8). This draws attention to a form of indirect governance based on the framing of liberalism and freedom, and contingent on crafting the conditions where questions of *who rules* and *how* are never asked – in a word, *developmentality* (Lie 2010; 2015). Drawing on Foucault's concept of governmentality (1991), developmentality describes and analyses various governance instruments and techniques within the aid sector that are contingent on liberal ideas and promises of freedom enabling the aid recipient to develop itself – but only within and in accordance with the donor's established development discourse. Thus, developmentality is rendered possible by the liberal partnership formation, which at the same time undermines its underlying tenets and credentials. This book addresses this paradox by exploring the new aid architecture and its conceptions of partnership in principle as well as in practice, introducing the developmentality concept to grasp what is unique about this way of managing partnership relations between donor and recipient institutions in the development sectors. The developmentality concept is outlined in detail in the next chapter. The remaining part of this chapter provides the empirical context and background for the developmentality concept, as well as my study of it.

Introducing and Approaching the New Aid Architecture

International aid has been intentionally transformed over the last two decades, leading to what is now described as a new architecture of aid. The advent of the new aid architecture has involved a change from first- to second-generation reform (Harrison 2004).[2] First-generation reform came in the late 1970s, with economic liberalization, privatization, state deregulation and market fundamentalism, as epitomized in the World Bank's infamous structural adjustment programmes and the Washington consensus (Williamson 1990, 2000).[3] Second-generation reform emerged from the mid-1990s, when donors and the Bank became increasingly concerned with systemic and political reform of their aid

recipients, seeking to alter and improve state structures as part of the evolving agenda for good governance (Abrahamsen 2004b; Weaver 2010). Whereas the first-generation reform focused on 'a reduction in the scope of state action, [second-generation reform] is concerned with the *nature* of state action … The ethos is that "process" is as important as "policy"' (Harrison 2004: 18). This should be seen as interlinked with the emerging partnership discourse; as the donor confers on the recipient greater responsibility and freedom to manage the overall development process – from planning to implementation – the recipient's governance structures and practices become increasingly important to the donor. Revamping both the structural and ideational levels of aid, this process has involved moving from 'uneasy modes of bondage based on harshly imposed borrowing conditions' (Gould 2005a: 1) to a partnership formation packaged in the jargon of more liberal and morally charged concepts of participation and ownership. Yet, despite the move from first- to second-generation reform and the recasting of aid relations in terms of partnership (Abrahamsen 2004a), '[i]t is clear that neither structural adjustment nor conditionality have gone away and, to some, it might seem politically dangerous to suggest otherwise' (Harrison 2001a: 658). The new form of conditionality serves to promote specific processes and not policies. It involves a new focus on the state as second-generation reform aims 'to construct an appropriate system of government to allow governance states to absorb and operationalise funds and technical assistance' (Harrison 2004: 21).

The 'new aid architecture' refers to three broad transformations of international aid (Mosse 2005a). First, there is a focus on neoliberal policy reforms rather than conventional investment projects. Donors no longer run projects independently, but collaborate to make concessional lending available for governments and assist them in implementing their own development policies. Second is the international commitment to poverty reduction – moving beyond the conventional policy agenda of economic growth to include more 'soft' and less-quantifiable dimensions, like environmental and social issues.[4] Thirdly, donors' reform agendas focus on institutional and general governance issues, transcending the traditional emphasis on economic and financial management.

The new aid architecture is not limited to cases involving the World Bank. Organizing aid around the concept of partnership and broadening the former economic growth agenda are ideas that permeate the international development apparatus, ranging from civil society organizations and NGOs to bilateral aid cooperation and the multilateral system of which the Bank is part. Today, all seem to have embraced the idea that better partnership modalities based on recipient participation

and ownership in the making and implementation of policies are not only an ethically better way of organizing development assistance but also vital to greater aid effectiveness. Needless to say, it was the latter rationale that prompted the Bank to embrace the new aid architecture (see Burnside and Dollar 2000; Mallabye 2004; chapter 3, this volume). Promoting local perspectives and sensitivity through participation, and greater commitment among local, implementing partners through ownership, have been assumed to translate into more development per dollar, although the official reasoning drew on moral assertions of emancipatory politics, empowerment and redressing established aid asymmetries.

The new aid architecture drew inspiration from the NGO sector's experience with partnership and participation during the NGO decade of the 1980s (Chambers 1983; Rahnema 1992). However, it was not until the late 1990s, when the Bank came into the picture, that the ideas gained momentum and proliferated among bi- and multilateral actors. In 1997, World Bank president James Wolfensohn – two years after assuming office, having come from the investment banking sector – embarked on a 30-month reform initiative called the Strategic Compact – 'a self-described "renewal" plan aimed at re-establishing the Bank's pre-eminent position as the world's leading development agency' (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005: 369). Driven by external and internal factors,[5] the Strategic Compact involved four key elements. First, a move away from one-size-fits-all standard approaches to more country-specific programmes, involving decentralization of project and staff, where the Bank's country managers would head their specific country portfolios. The second element involved moving beyond the growth paradigm to invest in neglected sectors such as social, environmental and governance-related projects, a process that facilitated the establishment of new thematic networks within the Bank. The third concerned the Bank as a 'knowledge bank' producing development expertise, reflecting the analytical work done in the thematic networks and how this knowledge is to be shared actively within and outside the Bank. Fourth was the Bank's internal reorganization along a matrix system, whereby the Bank's 'networks' were separated from its 'operations', as a way of strengthening implementation of the three first elements (ibid.; Pincus and Winters 2002). Chapter 4 in this volume examines the knowledge bank from within, arguing that the matrix system serves to institutionalize a 'battlefield of knowledge' (Long and Long 1992) in which different knowledge systems and competing thematic networks vie for influence over the operational side of the Bank – and, in the process, the networks pay more heed to operational demands than to their own

thematic profile. Chapter 3 focuses on the operationalization of the first two elements, known as the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF; Wolfensohn 1999), which outlines the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as the Bank's interpretation of the new aid architecture outlining its new partnership model and the broadened development scope. Through the Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), signed by almost all authoritative bi- and multilateral development agencies, the new aid architecture, with its gatekeeping notions of partnership, participation and ownership, has become a ubiquitous part of managing global development. In aid-speak, this meant 'putting the last first' (Chambers 1983; Baaz 2005; Cornwall and Scoones 2011) – which in Bank parlance is known as putting developing countries 'in the driver's seat' (Wolfensohn 1999).

The partnership discourse emerged from recognition of the shortcomings of top–down approaches and the ineffectiveness of externally imposed expert knowledge (Cooke and Kothari 2001). To mitigate external trusteeship, the aid relation has been recast as one of partnership (Abrahamsen 2004a). 'Authentic partnership implies, inter alia, a joint commitment to long-term interaction, shared responsibility for achievement, reciprocal obligation, equality, mutuality and a balance of power' (Fowler 2000: 3). The equal relationship of partners is seen as a value in itself, as well as an instrumental way of strengthening the impact of aid by creating local commitment, or ownership, while fostering and enabling recipient participation (see Pouligny 2009). Whether partnership is seen as a reality or as an ideal to strive for, most analysts agree that practice has generally fallen so far short of the ideal requirements of partnership that the main function of the term seems to be to mask existing asymmetries in the relationship (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Baaz 2005). Donor representatives, however, are more prone to take the 'partnership' label at face value (Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman 2006; Chapman and Wendoh 2007). Chambers notes three usages of the term 'participation': first, as a cosmetic label to make whatever is proposed appear good due to the formal requirements of a participatory approach, even though practice tends to remain top–down; second, as a co-opting strategy for mobilizing local labour in order to reduce project costs, meaning 'they' (the recipients) participate in 'our' (the donors') projects; third, as a process of empowerment that enables local people to make their own analyses, to take command, to gain in confidence and to implement their own choices and decisions so that 'we' participate in 'their' project (Chambers 1995). The developmentality concept proposes an alternative understanding, viewing the partnership discourse as a 'new governance mechanism'.

The new aid architecture should be understood against what makes it novel – that it is meant to replace top–down conditionality approaches. Conditionality represents the antithesis of the bottom–up thinking integral to participation and partnership. The top–down conditionality approach involves most of the ideas that the partnership discourse intends to overcome, such as donor trusteeship and one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions without sensitivity to context, local knowledge or borrowers' domestic political constraints and needs (Stone 2008). Conditionality does not automatically ignore recipient knowledge and needs, but when these do not fit with those of the donor, the donor-devised policy conditions trump local concerns. Compared to participation, conditionality is a less theorized term. This is due to its paternalistic connotations and because there is no normative programme behind the concept (apart from pushing one's will through) as with participation; moreover, it represents ideas and practices that development practitioners generally frown on. Conditionality is more of a descriptive term employed by scholars and practitioners to denote a particular policy package or means for enforcing certain policies. These two meanings are interlinked. As policy, conditionality is highly associated with the Washington Consensus and the Bank's structural adjustment programmes of privatization, liberalization, state deregulation and market fundamentalism. As this policy package has not been generally abandoned, conditionality is associated more with the *means* employed by the donors to enforce their policies and get recipient institutions to subscribe to these – meaning that donors make their aid conditional on the pursuit of particular policies among recipient institutions. Aid-tying set by the donor is an integral part of everyday life in aid relations. Conditionality 'is not an aim in itself but an instrument by which other objectives are pursued' (Stokke 1995: 3); thus conditionality represents an exercise of coercion aimed at pursuing the donor's stipulated goals. However, concerns have been voiced as to what conditionality may achieve, as donors have been insufficiently motivated to punish recipients for non-compliance (Collier 1997), reflecting the general donor dilemma: the need to 'choose between underspending their budget (and thus losing influence both within their development-country partners and within their own governments) and giving aid to bad-policy countries' (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor 2004: 218).

'He who pays the piper calls the tune' expresses the common understanding or donor–recipient relationships, despite the advent of the new aid architecture and the rhetorical dismissal of conditionality. The donor still controls the vital resource in the relation – funds – and thus holds the power to decide what to fund and when to stop funding,

thereby retaining effective control, regardless of by whom and how the policies are devised or implemented.

Classic anthropological theory points to more complex relations between giver and receiver. In *The Gift,* Mauss (1954) asserts that exchanges of goods and resources are driven by other incentives than merely economic profit. Gifts serve to maintain social relationships and reproduce social systems. In gift economies it is not only the benefactor who is expected to give. Equally important are the expectations placed on the recipient; that is, the obligations to receive *and return* the gift. This reciprocal aspect, or the gift's 'total prestation', is thus a matter of respect and acknowledgement, involving the honour of both giver and receiver. While it is by no means certain that a gift relation between bureaucratic institutions is best understood as a system of 'total prestations',[6] Mauss's work does alert us to the fact that there are flows in both directions between donor and recipient. Stirrat and Henkel (1997) use Mauss's insight to analyse 'the development gift', and to show that through 'partnership' the donor achieves legitimacy, mission validation and a symbolically important link to the poor and marginalized. Thus, while the recipient's dependence on funding is concrete and evident, there are less obvious forms of symbolic capital flowing the other way. While this is still an asymmetrical relation, there is dependence in both directions, and power does not rest unambiguously with one party alone. In aid relations, not only does an aid recipient need a donor, but a donor also needs a recipient. And with greater responsibilities and freedom conveyed the recipient institution — as per the new aid architecture — it becomes paramount to have good partners as well as forge a good partnership. For the donor this becomes a balancing act, and upholding the partnership necessitates continuous negotiations and compromises. For instance, as Harrison (2001a: 673) argues, the World Bank's dependence on Uganda as an example of success meant turning a blind eye to corrupt practices and mismanagement in the state apparatus.

The formation of partnership takes place in the pragmatic interplay and interdependence of the rhetoric or participation and the practices of conditionality. The notion of developmentality draws attention to this apparent paradox inherent in development aid: the nexus between the contradictory approaches of conditionality and participation. Both participation and conditionality are girding ideas of the new aid architecture, where the former seeks to overcome the latter. This signals a profound shift from top–down approaches to bottom–up ones, where donor institutions withdraw from direct operational activities to a remote role of monitoring and funding – producing and produced by

an *audit culture* (see Strathern 2000b). The shift on the donor side from direct to indirect engagement in the development process is thus paralleled by a shift from a passive to an active client on the receiving end. This means – at least on the rhetorical level – a transfer of power and influence from donor to recipient institution, with 'a strategic shift in the management of North–South relations away from the carrot and the stick of credits and conditionalities to a subtler dynamics of alleged mutual complicity' (Gould 2005c: 63). Such mutual complicity is arguably concealed and produced by the partnership discourse formed in the nexus of participation and conditionality. It provides the setting for the developmentality concept and this book's analysis of the World Bank–Uganda partnership.

Exploring the effects of the new aid architecture and the Bank–Uganda partnership formation, the concept of developmentality attends to the disjunctures between the donor and recipient institutions, as well as between the official order and rhetoric of participation on the one side, and the practices of control, governance and conditionality on the other. Using the concept of developmentality for analysis, this book shows how the Bank can speak the language of participation and ownership, all the while tightening its conditionality criteria for loan disbursement. Although Bank staff may not see these mechanisms as based on conditionality, Uganda is still compelled to undertake reforms and engage in lengthy, repetitive performance rituals as part of the new partnership model in order to get funding. These rituals might appear as a charade, since representatives from both sides know that the Bank will ultimately provide lending regardless of events, but they have at least two important features that amount to developmentality. First, they serve the purpose of making the Bank's policies those of the recipient. Second, they serve to make the recipients accountable primarily to the Bank for implementing their 'own' policies.

Multi-sited Ethnography:
Approaching the Bank and the Ministry

The concept of 'developmentality' has been developed from an extended case study of the partnership relation between the World Bank and its Ugandan counterpart. Recognizing the *relational* aspect of power – that power is not something that someone has, but is activated, formed and accentuated in the practical encounter between different actors, as the partnership relation – this study explores and analyses how the World Bank–Uganda partnership is articulated at various levels – in structure

and practice, in discourse and agency, formal and informal – on the donor and recipient sides as well as in their encounter. Multi-sited fieldwork was required for this ethnography, or aidnography (Gould 2004), of the adventurous aidland (Mosse 2011; Lie 2006a), to unpack policy and capture the relational aspect of power and, indeed, the partnership relation itself (McGee 2004; Green 2012). The ethnographic approach provides a way to give 'voice for the underrepresented, a vehicle for revealing the local practices that expert discourses conceal' (Kelly 2012: 79–80). In 2005 and 2006 I spent two months of participatory observation and data collection at the World Bank headquarters in Washington DC, and ten months in Uganda, mostly within the government ministry responsible for managing Uganda's relations with external donor agencies, but also collecting data among other donors and local stakeholders implicitly involved or affected by the formation of partnership between the Bank and its Ugandan counterpart.

To an anthropologist, walking into a village to conduct fieldwork is probably easier than entering a ministry or a multilateral institution. However, gaining access to the Bank and the Ugandan ministry proved to be less long-consuming and bureaucratic than I had expected – at least initially – and in practice it did not differ so much from my previous fieldwork in Ethiopia's north-eastern Afar region in terms of 'following the loops', as the anthropological credo goes, and having to gain acceptance from authoritative informants who served as gatekeepers.

My first inquiry about fieldwork for the present study went to a few Bank staffers whose contact details I had acquired from colleagues and friends. Via email, I introduced my project of studying the partnership relation between the World Bank and Ethiopia in the context of good governance. My original interest in Ethiopia before shifting focus to Uganda drew on my previous work where I had studied a small agro-pastoral development project (US$ 150,000) and the partnership relation between a Norwegian NGO and its two Ethiopian partner institutions, which initially led me to the concept of developmentality (Lie 2004). The small project was celebrated as a participatory, bottom–up project based on equal partnership throughout the aid chain, with all informants emphasizing how the project had attended to the wishes and concerns of the beneficiaries.

However, I found that this was at best only partially true. Yes, the project, which aimed to enhance the livelihoods of agro-pastoralists, included a good governance component – incongruous in an area where there were hardly any formal governance structures. The good governance component had been brought in because of external expectations – not in connection with any participatory approaches. Two years prior

to the fieldwork I had worked as an assistant for the Norwegian NGO involved in this project. I was to survey all its partners, asking them what they were doing regarding good governance, as the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD),[7] the back-donor, had recently added 'good governance' to its checkpoint laundry list of standardized reporting and application forms, thus signalling new topical areas of importance. This had come as a requirement from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, to enable them to monitor and, in effect, direct the diverse aid activities of all DAC member countries in faraway places. Although the project workers in Afar could not explain how the good governance component had been made part of the project, it was nevertheless formally framed as drawing on participatory planning, as was the rest of the project – and that was what kindled my first interest in developmentality.

Passing through Addis Ababa on my way home from six months of fieldwork, I met some diplomats from the Norwegian embassy. They mentioned the ongoing drafting of the new Ethiopian poverty reduction strategy, where the donors' push for good governance policies was proving contentious for the government. The recurrence of good governance and donor involvement in the domestic strategy process provided the momentum for my approach to the Bank.

Within a few days I had received a positive response to my email request about fieldwork: there was a team within the Bank that found my work relevant, and they would help to facilitate my study. However, they advised against studying the Bank's partnership model in Ethiopia, on the grounds that relations were politically tense, which, coupled with a rather closed governmental bureaucracy, would not allow the necessary access on the recipient side of the partnership. Amongst various alternatives they suggested Uganda, which they described as politically open, and as having a successful development story with cordial relations with the Bank, and thus research access should be easier – adding, of course, that studying what they regarded as a development success story would also be more conducive to their own work than yet another critical study of an aid failure. Shifting my empirical focus to the Bank's partnership in Uganda, I began with two months of fieldwork at the Bank in early 2005 – by which time the positive portrayals of Uganda had started to deteriorate, due to President Museveni's announcement that he would amend the constitution and lift the term limits on the presidency to allow him to run for a third term in office. Referred to as the 'political transition', this gave rise to critical concerns about democracy and good governance issues among the Bank's Uganda team and the overall donor community in Uganda (see chapter

6). The political transition politicized the partnership relation, causing friction between the Bank and its Ugandan counterpart and challenging donor harmonization in Uganda. Inevitably, the political transition and the demotion of Uganda from being a donor darling came to serve as a prominent political backdrop to the partnership formation, and my study of it.

The re-envisioning of Uganda also affected my research. My preparatory contacts with the Bank had led me to expect unrestricted access to staff, processes and meetings in both Washington DC and Kampala – but now the growing tensions in the Bank–Uganda partnership meant restricted access, curtailing the possibilities of participatory observation. Instead of being part of the processes, I now had to seek out data and informants, from the offices I was allotted in the Bank (see chapter 4) and from a branch within the Ugandan Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) designated for coordinating the various government agencies' approaches to and dialogues with foreign donor institutions (see chapter 5).[8] The entry point for attaining these privileged vantage points for conducting research was that I placed myself at their disposal as a self-financed, voluntary intern. I offered to contribute wherever they deemed relevant, in exchange for being allowed to collect data. This deal proved more rewarding for me than them – neither in the Bank nor at the OPM was I ever given any significant duties, even though I would have welcomed them. I must assume that there were no tasks for me. Perhaps they found my qualifications inappropriate to their needs, or the rising tensions between the two may have made them reluctant to include me. Or it might just be another example of the challenges associated with 'studying up' (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997): that the powerful ones on the top may simply refuse to be studied ethnographically from the bottom (Lie 2013). In any case, I do not blame them and can understand that it is problematic to include an outsider in their ongoing work. Instead of working there, I used these offices as bases from which to conduct research. Being physically on the inside and associated with the host, I was not only introduced to various people and occasionally invited to meetings and seminars, but it was also easier to establish contact and touch base with informants. Although my methodology involved a mix of approaches, including participatory observation, much of the research took the form of meeting people for discussions, conversations and interviews. In general, the regular routine involved going every day to one of the offices I had been allotted (in the Bank and the OPM), and then taking things from there.

Both these fieldwork contexts were highly bureaucratic settings involving strict formal codes. Following the loops and drifting with my

informants was possible, but only up to a point. The bureaucratic character of the field often meant that I was excluded from certain settings, especially those now deemed to be of a 'too political' character. The sudden rise in political tensions between the Bank and Uganda was not only detrimental to their partnership, but also affected my research by curtaining its empirical sphere. Once, at a meeting in Uganda between government and donor officials, having introduced myself in the usual presentation round, I was asked to leave. That was the only time I was actually expelled, but I was refused access to other meetings on grounds of 'politics' and tension between the parties – all the while the Bank had an apolitical mandate and both sides kept insisting on the apolitical nature of their partnership. Although this challenged my research, such events told me something about the partnership and the empirical field, while also serving as a good entry point for meeting and discussing with informants; it demonstrated that processes of exclusion and the challenges involved in living up to the ideals of ethnographic fieldwork may prove just as interesting and rewarding for data collection as actual processes of inclusion.

Take, for instance, the following arrival story: early in my Uganda fieldwork and on the request of a ministerial senior official, I had to present a letter stating who I was and that I was an independent researcher – meaning independent of the Ugandan government, the Norwegian embassy and the World Bank. The official wanted the letter to be signed by either the embassy or the Bank's country office, but neither of them wished to do so. Both referred to my 'independence', but it was clear that they now considered my research to be too political, and they had no wish to be formally associated with it, for fear of liability – even though what they were being asked to sign stated precisely the opposite. Finally, and after about a month of transcontinental 'microdiplomacy', the ministry official signed the letter himself, after delivering a tirade about development bureaucracy and how donors say aid is apolitical while refusing to sign the letter, due to political concerns. In effect, this yielded greater understanding and sympathy towards my project from an important gatekeeper to the Ugandan bureaucracy, and good ethnography to my partnership analysis. As the official added laughingly, 'this story will provide you with information for at least one chapter!' Well, it did not come out as a full chapter, but made more than a footnote in demonstrating how a lack of practical access to data might in itself be a good source of information and could say something about the field.

The World Bank is by far the most influential development agency, not only in Uganda but also worldwide (Harrison 2004, 2006; Moore

2007). It holds both a gatekeeping and a formative role vis-à-vis global development discourses: what the Bank does, and how it does it, matters not only for its aid-receiving partners but also for other donor agencies. The Bank surpasses any other development organization in financial muscle and staff size; moreover, the extensive economic research undertaken by its staff has made the Bank a self-proclaimed knowledge bank with a tremendous databank available to development practitioners and researchers. Coupled with the means and methods available for disseminating and applying this knowledge (its loan and credit schemes accompanied by certain policies), the Bank enjoys a tremendous outreach and holds a prominent position in framing the policies and practices of the international development apparatus (Pincus and Winters 2002; Einhorn 2006; Marshall 2008). What happens within the Bank also has a bearing on its external activities and the discourses it disseminates (Einhorn 2001; Wade 2001, 2002b; Weaver 2008). Chapter 3 in this book outlines the official Bank discourse and partnership modality, while chapter 4 moves beyond the official discourse and focuses on the Bank's internal practices. We will see a less coherent and monolithic institution, where external representations and formal order – later conveyed to client countries like Uganda – are the result of internal knowledge battles and competing interests.

Uganda has been a net importer of development aid and policies ever since independence in 1962. Over the last decade and a half, foreign aid has made up about half of Uganda's annual national budget, usually fluctuating between 47 and 52 per cent (Fisher 2014).[9] This dependence on aid has largely sustained its asymmetrical relations with the outside world, causing patterns of paternalism and neocolonialism (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Harrison 2004). However, due to the post-independence political ruptures and frequent coups d'état,[10] it was not until 1986, when President Yoweri Museveni came to power through an armed rebellion with his non-partisan National Resistance Movement system, that Uganda experienced sufficient political stability for domestic and external development efforts to take root.

Interestingly, soon after assuming office, the erstwhile revolutionary Marxist Museveni embraced the neoliberal structural adjustments advocated by the World Bank and other international donors (Museveni 1997; Rubongoya 2007). This created fertile ground for a largely frictionless aid relation, with donors turning a blind eye to the dictatorship in favour of the impressive economic growth experienced by a newly stable Uganda. Museveni's domestic and international standing was further enhanced when, in 1995, he reintroduced democracy and put a two-term limit on the presidency. Now an elected president, Museveni

was hailed as a representative of the new breed of African freedom fighters who voluntarily introduce democracy after ascending to power by the gun. Uganda was celebrated as a success story and Museveni soon became a donor darling, receiving ever-increasing amounts of development assistance despite his criticisms and mockery of international donors, which were taken as an expression of an empowered, emancipated leader (Mwenda 2010). The influx of development assistance was further intensified by donor needs for a success story: developmental criticisms had been mounting after international development lost momentum, rationale and funding when the end of the Cold War brought a stop to development as a geopolitical ideological instrument. Because of its cordial donor relations and good performance, in 1999 Uganda became a pilot country for the World Bank's new aid architecture and partnership formation (Dijkstra and van Donge 2001; Cargill 2004).

In a nutshell, being a pilot country of the new aid architecture formally meant that Ugandan authorities would devise their own national development plan while the Bank would retreat from direct operational work to a remote position as mere financier of the government's own activities. In development speak, it meant moving away from the infamous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) where disbursement of loans and credits was made conditional on abiding by the Bank's market fundamentalism and neoliberal policies. The new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper model – officially launched in 1999 and subsequently put to use and disseminated as the Bank's primus modus operandi when establishing new or renegotiating old partnership agreements[11] – was meant to be less patronizing, by pivoting on the government's own development strategy as formulated in the PRSP (Wolfensohn 1999). However, while the content of the PRSP is to be devised by the receiving government, its structure and function are defined solely by the Bank. Moreover, the government-produced PRSP requires Bank approval in order to become effective, cement the partnership relation and release funds – which means that the freedom vested in this model is framed and thus restricted. The PRSP model saw good possibilities in Uganda, where the government had already made its own comprehensive development plan a few years earlier and, enjoying cordial relations with the donors, had asked them to support it. Indeed, some have argued that Uganda was not only a PRSP pilot country but also its model (Mallaby 2004; Mugambe 2010). From the beginning, the new aid architecture, as epitomized by the PRSP model and its partnership formation, found conducive grounds in Uganda. The ethnographic account in this book shows how the Ugandan PRSP gradually came to resemble any other Bank-supported development

strategy as the developmentality regime took form in the nexus of participatory and conditionality approaches, leading to diminishing government ownership of Bank-supported policies as well as growing frictions in the once- cordial partnership relation.

Combining Post-development and Actor-oriented Approaches

Developmentality is not only a feature at the structural and formal levels of aid. As a form of power it is even more compelling in development practice, when and where donor and recipient institutions encounter each other (Crush 1995; Ziai 2007; Da Costa 2010). This has implications beyond the empirical scope and the analytical approaches: just as it is necessary to engage both the donor and recipient sides in order to explore the partnership formation, it is also essential to explore partnership at its structural and practical levels. Hence, this book draws on multifaceted empirical and analytical approaches, not only by examining the concept of partnership in donor as well as recipient institutions, but also by analytically engaging the concept of partnership at its formal and practical levels. That said, it is important not to compartmentalize these entities (Rossi 2006) but rather to explore how they impinge on each other and are mutually constitutive to and of each other. This is crucial, and not only for analytical reasons. It also reflects the perspectives of development actors by conforming to the very partnership idea that connects donor and recipient institutions, and aid practitioners' rationale of putting the partnership policy and other development discourses into practice. Interestingly, while these practices and encounters are enabled by the new aid architecture and its partnership formation, they might also undermine the very same order that instigated these practices in the first place.

This book provides an ethnographic exploration and analysis of this seeming paradox and how the new aid architecture unfolds in practice at different levels of the partnership that links benefactor and beneficiary institutions together. The paradox points to a disjuncture between policy and practice that cannot be grasped at the level of discourse or practice alone, but that necessitates combining a post-structural approach to development with an actor-oriented analysis (Lie 2007, 2008a; Friedman 2012). Combining different analytical approaches is necessary due to the character of the empirical field and the multi-sited ethnographic approaches for cutting across the dichotomies between donor and recipient, the global and the local, and the formal and the informal, to enable us to track the new aid architecture in the multiple

contexts that are shaping and shaped by it (see Lewis et al. 2003; Mosse and Lewis 2005). The intention behind the new aid architecture and its partnership formation is to merge otherwise polar entities: donor and recipient. Studying how this logic is articulated on one side of the aid chain only would be reductionist, both analytically and empirically, and would undermine the social forces that affect and are affected by the new aid architecture. A multi-faceted analytic approach makes it possible to grasp these cultural logics, recognizing that they are always multiplying and are contextually produced (Marcus 1995; Falzon 2009). Viewing the development partnership from only one side (donor or recipient) or one level (structure or practice) obstructs us from analysing its relational aspects and how actors and ideas, and structures and practices, impinge on each other and shape practice.

Analytically, and in order to approach the different levels of aid in their contextual and multiple settings, I combine two different perspectives – post-development theory, and an actor-oriented approach. Post-development theory offers a post-structural critique of institutional development, drawing on and extending Foucault's reconceptualization of power–knowledge formations as discourse (Escobar 1984; Gardner and Lewis 1996). Post-development theory seeks to clarify how the development discourse articulates and imposes First World knowledge onto the Third World. The institutional donor apparatuses infuse this discourse with significant power, making post-development scholars focus on 'the way in which discourses of development help shape the reality they pertain to address, and how alternative conceptions of the problem have been marked off as irrelevant' (Pieterse 2000; Schuurman 2000; Nustad 2004: 13). Applying Foucault's work on the appropriation of mind in modern societies to North–South relations, post-development scholars argue that development produces postcolonial subjects and permeates the South as a category defined purely in relation to the North (Brigg 2002; Escobar 2007). Such a colonialization of the mind arguably draws on institutional development's disciplinary and normalizing processes understood as an intentional project to expand modern, Western reason – leading some to argue that 'development colonised the world by ordering it into "us" and "them", the "developed" and the "underdeveloped"' (Nustad 1998: 42; see also Manzo 1991; Brigg 2002). Such a view gives rise to fundamental social theoretical concerns regarding the discourse–agency relation and the power that one imbues discourses with. More profoundly, it puts into question our conceptions of subjectivity and individual freedom. In *The Anti-Politics Machine*, part of the post-development canon, Ferguson writes, of the discursive power over the individual found in the devel-

opment sector, that 'whatever interests may be at work and whatever they may think they are doing, they can only operate through a complex set of social and cultural structures so deeply embedded and so ill-perceived that the outcome may be only a baroque and unrecognizable transformation of the original intention' (Ferguson 1994: 17; Jensen and Winthereik 2012). Such a version of post-development runs the risk of social reductionism and totalitarianism, since everything becomes (subject to) discourse, rendering the concepts of agency and individual freedom meaningless. As such, post-development becomes counterproductive to its seminal post-modern rationale of waging a war on totality (see Sachs 1992; Calhoun 1995; Escobar 1997): while post-development criticized institutional development for neglecting the variety and complexity among aid recipients, post-development fails to address the same variety within institutional development as a result of its neglect of agency, caused by too strict a discursive focus. 'By believing too much in the powers of discourse, one is disabled from tracing all those minor infrastructural and interactional transformations that partnership brings about in multiple settings' (Jensen and Winthereik 2012: 98). Post-development is therefore criticized for substituting the dead hand of determinism: when there is no freedom in discourse and no possibility to resist discursive power, there can be no autonomous subject that prevents any meaningful concept of freedom and, consequently, the possibility of emancipatory politics. The neglect of agency, it is argued, makes an empirical travesty of post-development (see Fraser 1989; Peet 1997; Kiely 1999; Oksala 2005).

Empirical complexity, actor perspectives and practice are notable by their absence from the analysis, even though many post-development scholars are social anthropologists. This might be due to at least two factors. Firstly, post-development perspectives emerged in the heyday of post-modernism and deconstruction, and everything seemed to be interpreted as or within discourse. Indicative was the gradual retreat of the social from much social science, due to what Kapferer (2005) called 'the rise and rise of social reductionism', where structural explanations and analysis seemed to prevail over actor approaches (see Grønhaug 2001). This has caused forced oppositions – between structure and agency, determinism and freedom, objectivism and subjectivism – in which the idea of the social is bypassed, creating dichotomies that distort our understanding of the interplay of different social forces (Kapferer 2004a). Secondly, the lack of agency and the over-reliance on discursive approaches are also due to a misinterpretation of Foucault's very notion of discourse (Venketesan and Yarrow 2012). As Gledhill (2000: 150) argues, Foucault sees power as relational and 'present in

all social relationships, permeating society in a capillary way'. The first point of resistance to discursive power 'must thus be individual strategies [that] counter specific forms of domination, even in minute, everyday ways' (ibid.). Here we see an ambiguity in Foucault's work: his insistence on power being relational and enabling individual resistance is not reflected in his analysis or empirical material. As noted by Gledhill, Foucault's 'talk about power inevitably provoking "resistance" has little real substance. His capillary model of power privileges the "micro-politics" of resistance, yet his analyses remain "top–down"' (ibid.: 152).

Post-development, I hold, has inherited this ambiguity: by analysing institutional development solely from a discursive perspective, agency is not only neglected, it is also equated with discourse, as discourse becomes the only analytical approach to account for the level of actors. The development discourse becomes 'a machine in which everyone is caught' (Foucault 1980), where the discourse overrides individual agency and, consequently, subjects are deprived of their ability to choose and resist.

Too strict a conception of discourse and its formative power has implications for how one treats actors, practice and complexity: it becomes an ethnographic blind alley where the rationality of instrumental policy is replaced with the anonymous automaticity of the machine (Mosse 2013). I found that such a strict notion of the post-development discourse and its formative power did not resonate with my empirical experience. Informants on the donor and recipient sides were perfectly aware of what they were doing and trying to achieve, and of the limitations and obstacles they were facing (Lie 2007). Rather than being on a discursive dope and unintentionally reproducing the development discourse, actors involved in the development apparatus can be manipulative or strategic, and can reject or reproduce whatever they are subject to. This relates to the classic problem of ideological consciousness: whereas Marx saw subjects as deriving from a commanding ideology ('they do it because they do not know what they are doing'), Zizek (1989) argues for individual reflexivity where people act consciously in relation to ideology ('they know they are subject to an ideology, and yet they do it'). Actually, this is not just an either/or question, as it can also be both – but at different times. The point here is that the level of ideological consciousness and the result of structure–actor or discourse–agency interfaces must be determined empirically (Long 2001). On top of theory concerns, experiencing this empirically – that people are involved in the aid partnership sometimes knowingly, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes reluctantly and sometimes indifferently –

made me realize I would have to complement post-development with an actor-oriented approach.

Why then should we bother at all with post-development theory, given its determinism and serious shortcomings in accounting for agency? In brief, the answer is that development takes place at different levels, and post-development provides a privileged vantage point for grasping the structural and discursive levels of aid. However, this macro-level should not be confused or equated with agency and practice, as some post-development scholars seem to do. Combining post-development and actor-oriented approaches rests on a critique of the former and its shortcomings. It also nuances the post-development approach, making it less totalitarian while demonstrating its relevance as *one* approach to *one* level of institutional development. Most importantly, combining different approaches enables us to reinstate the social as part of the analysis – to see how individual and collective actors affect, and are affected by, what post-developers describe as 'development discourses'. The analytical point of departure becomes the intersection of what are otherwise seen as polar entities: discourse and agency, structure and actor, donor and recipient, the formal and the informal.

Combining a discursive and actor-oriented approach is premised on seeing the data these approaches cast off at the same analytical level: as different knowledge systems. This allows us to analyse what happens in the encounter between discourses and actors – how, why and when they intersect and influence each other. These encounters are expressions of what Long has described as a 'social interface': the 'critical point of intersection between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found' (Long 2004: 35; Long 1989). The idea of interface implies a shift in analytical focus, from the various discourses and systems of knowledge towards the various situations where these meet and become articulated. It requires an actor perspective, making the theoretical conception of a priori formative discourses obsolete, and advances an empirically grounded analysis of knowledge and social power. Interface studies focus on the discontinuities in social life (e.g. values, knowledge and power) that typically arise when different and often conflicting lifeworlds or social fields intersect, creating 'battlefields of knowledge' (Long and Long 1992). By manifesting issues of friction and contestation, these battlefields reveal both the inner workings of development and what might be worth focusing on analytically. However, the outcome of these knowledge battles must be determined empirically.

Those operating in such interfaces often act as brokers (Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan 2002; Lewis and Mosse 2006b). In encountering and working within the development discourse, project staff on the donor as well as the recipient sides, locally and at head-quarters level, can be manipulative and strategic with regard to im-posed discourses and expert knowledge systems. Translating between different knowledge realms – formal and informal, donor and recipi-ent – and converting ambiguous meaning and conflicting interests into seemingly coherent policy comprises a large portion of what develop-ment agents do. By applying techniques of brokerage they can have a tremendous impact on the local articulation and reception of global ideas and externally funded projects. As the intersecting point of local knowledge and external discourse, these actors, or brokers, can apply techniques to ensure that external ideas and projects gain relevance, in-fluence and legitimacy at the local implementing level. The very point of brokerage itself underpins the importance of directing analytical at-tention to actors and of seeing discourses of development as articulated through actors. Actor-oriented perspectives, interface and brokerage permit analytical distance from the self-representations of the actors involved; this can help to avoid normative confusion regarding actor intentions – since brokerage does not necessarily imply intentions of manipulation on the sly. Brokerage is a concept that exists exclusively for the sake of analysing what happens in a situation of interface. Bro-kers are social actors implanted in a local arena who serve as interme-diaries and thus represent the social carriers and discursive bearers of donor–recipient relations. They operate in social interfaces and 'trans-late the discourse and actions of given actors in terms [that] make sense to partners situated far away at the other end of the brokerage chain' (Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan 2002: 17). As such, bro-kerage and interfaces, as articulated by actors at various levels of the aid chain connecting donor and recipient organizations, represent priv-ileged entry points for studying local expressions and effects of global ideas and discursive power, like the power found in developmentality and the new aid architecture.

Combining the post-development and actor-oriented approaches in multiple settings makes it possible to grasp the situated complexity and variety of the new aid architecture and its partnership formation. This enables us to study how different systems of knowledge – at the formal or informal level, at the actor or discourse level, or among donor or re-cipient institutions – intersect and interrelate. And that in turn prevents compartmentalization of the lifeworlds of donors and recipients – as so happens with interface studies (Rossi 2006). An empirical actor-oriented

approach helps to open up the black boxes of institutional development discourse by addressing the contextual interchange between policy and practice. It offers the possibility of understanding how meanings associated with development are produced, disputed and consumed in practice, illuminating the multiple connotations and denotations the term holds for those involved in institutional development.

For empirical and theoretical reasons, the multi-sited, mixed-methods approach thus became a necessity when making this ethnography of the new aid architecture, its partnership formation and, by implication, developmentality. Using multiple approaches is also a precondition for escaping the kind of analytical and empirical reductionism associated with both post-structuralism and actor-oriented approaches in their purest form. The very notion of partnership serves as the node from which this extended case study of the World Bank–Uganda partnership unfolds so that we may grasp institutional development at its various empirical and analytical levels, including the many contexts where these intersect. Moreover, unpacking the new notion and reformation of partnership as part of the new aid architecture requires connecting micro and macro in the present and the past to study the impacts of world systems and globalization in particular situations and localities (Evens and Handelman 2005, 2006; Sahlins 2004) – as will be shown in this book's developmentality analysis of the situated articulation of the World Bank–Uganda partnership.

Notes

1. These ideas were operationalized and ratified by international donor agencies (multi- and bilateral) through the declarations of Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) on issues of aid effectiveness, ownership, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability.
2. Stokke (1995) makes a similar distinction between first- and second-generation conditionality.
3. Williamson originally coined the term 'Washington consensus' to denote the least common denominator of policies pursued by Washington-based institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department to Latin America during the 1980s. The term covered a set of ten specific policy prescriptions constituting the 'standard' reform package; since then, the term has been used in a different and broader sense, as synonymous with market fundamentalism, privatization, liberalization, neoliberal policies, deregulation of state institutions and the intentionally expanding role of the free market.
4. Important here is the emergence of the 'sustainable development' concept, which has managed to merge the predominant rationale of economic

growth with those of social and environmental issues (Wade 2004; Bøås and Vevatne 2004).

5. Among the external factors were: changes in the Bank's environments, postwar geopolitics and the demise of the role of development's soft power to contain communism; altered interests among the Bank's major donor member-states; waning public support and budget constraints; the increase in private capital flows to developing countries; and developing countries graduating to become donor countries. Internal factors included: a recognized lack of efficiency; low compliance rate among borrowers to established conditions and legal covenants attached to loans; and weak organizational culture within the Bank, with rewards and promotions distributed based on quantity, causing the project management to wane after project approval – in turn, derailing project implementation (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005).

6. Mauss's work has a wide geographical and historical scope. In the introduction he quotes *Håvamål* from *Edda,* and asserts that in Scandinavia, amongst others, exchange and *contracts* are implemented as gifts, which in theory are voluntary but in practice and reality represent an obligation (Mauss 1954) – a perspective with parallels in the disconnect between donor partnership rhetoric and the actual practices of such partnership.

7. NORAD is a government directorate under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and provides funding and policy guidance to Norwegian NGOs.

8. I was based at OPM's Section for Policy Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation.

9. This percentage has declined somewhat in recent years due to the discovery of oil in western Uganda and increased Chinese activities in the country. It was said that, in 2005, donor contributions made up about 48 to 52 per cent of the national budget. A representative of the Bank of Uganda writes that 'Uganda is a country that is heavily dependent on budget support to finance nearly 50% of its total expenditures' (Atingi-Ego 2005: ii). On top of this comes aid not given as budget support. In 2005, net official development assistance to Uganda was US$ 1,191 million, up from US$ 604 million in 1999 which was the level (although fluctuating) during the 1990s. In 1985 it was US$ 179 million and in 1989 US$ 446 million. In 2007 it was US$ 1,736 million (source: World Development Indicators, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?page=1).

10. Between 1962 and 1986 Uganda experienced six violent changes of government: Idi Amin's 1971 coup and subsequent eight-year reign, when between 100,000 and 500,000 civilians were killed, is the most infamous. The Museveni-led Bush War (1981–86; also known as the Ugandan Civil War or Resistance War) brought a similar number of casualties and losses.

11. The PRSP model was rapidly rolled out by the Bank. By September 2003, it had already been implemented in fifty-four countries, with more to follow suit (Gould 2005a: 3).